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Abstract 
Fuel cladding is one of the key components in a fission reactor that confines radioactive 
materials inside a fuel tube. During reactor operation, however, cladding is sometimes 
breached, and radioactive materials leak from the fuel pellet into the coolant water through 
the breach. The primary coolant water is therefore monitored so that any leak is quickly 
detected; coolant water is periodically sampled, and the concentration of radioactive iodine 
131 (I-131), for example, is measured. Depending on the measured leakage concentration, the 
faulty fuel assembly with leaking rod is removed from the reactor and replaced immediately 
or at the next refueling. In the present study, an effort has been made to develop a 
methodology to optimize the management for replacement of faulty fuel assemblies due to 
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cladding failures using measured leakage concentration. A model numerical equation is 
proposed to describe the time evolution of an increase in I-131 concentration due to cladding 
failures and is then solved using the Monte Carlo method as a function of sampling rate. Our 
results indicate that, to achieve rationalized management of failed fuels, higher resolution to 
detect a small amount of I-131 is not necessarily required, but more frequent sampling is 
favorable. 
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1. Introduction 
A fuel cladding tube in a fission reactor separates the radioactive fuel pellet from the 
rest of the reactor system and has an important role as a barrier against the leak of radioactive 
materials to the exterior. By the presence of the tube, the concentration of radioactive 
materials in the primary coolant water remains suppressed at a sufficiently low level to 
mitigate the consequences of so-called pipe rupture accidents, leading to an effective 
reduction in radiation exposure risks for the public. Although the fabrication of fuel cladding 
has been accomplished by high-quality processes to prevent the formation of manufacturing 
defects, cladding failures can still occur due to such phenomena during operation as 
pellet-cladding interaction (PCI), fretting corrosion, excessive corrosion, stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC), crud deposition, and embrittlement due to hydrides [1-4]. Once cladding 
failures occur, radioactive materials leak from the fuel pellet into the primary coolant water 
through a cladding breach. To detect those leaks, the coolant water is periodically monitored, 
typically a few times a week, and the primary coolant water is kept under surveillance to 
confirm the concentration of radioactive iodine 131 (I-131) in the sampled water within the 
limiting conditions for operation (LCO) with regard to fuel leaks. The threshold maximum 
concentration satisfying LCO is defined by the safety regulations in Japan and determined to 
minimize radiation exposure risks for the public.  
When the LCO regulation is violated, the reactor is immediately shut down to remove 
and replace the faulty fuel assembly with leaking rod. In practice, however, the faulty fuel 
assembly is replaced at a much lower concentration than the LCO threshold, which is a 
consequence of practical reactor operations that obey a different shutdown rule than the LCO 
regulation. This shutdown rule is decided in advanced by reactor operators themselves, which 
is usually more conservative than the LCO. As there is currently a growing tendency for 
reactor operators in Japan to obey more conservative operator rules than the LCO, the number 
of unscheduled immediate reactor shutdowns has recently increased, as shown in Figure 1, in 
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which the annual number of operational responses to fuel leaks is represented for commercial 
pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs) in Japan [5].  
These conservative judgments initially seem to be favorable in terms of safety, but, 
when considering a material’s integrity and, moreover, overall reactor safety, such an 
immoderate conservative judgment is not always favorable because the materials in a reactor 
are damaged by additional thermal and mechanical loadings during unscheduled shutdown 
processes. Thus, fuel leaks due to cladding failures require different levels of operator 
intervention that depend on the degree of severity of cladding failures or leaks. When the leak 
is not so severe, no immediate response is required because the risks caused by immediate 
reactor shutdown are considered to be larger than those caused by leaving failed fuels in place. 
In this case, the faulty fuel assembly with leaking rod should not be removed until the next 
refueling. When the leak is significant, however, an immediate reactor shutdown is required 
to remove the faulty fuel assembly.  
The problem is that the degree of severity of cladding failures is not always 
sufficiently obvious for the operator to choose one of the two above interventions because 
severity varies over time; the severity is not always clear, except with the opportunities of 
water sampling for monitoring, although many efforts have been made to establish a method 
to predict the future behavior of fuel claddings during use in a reactor [6-11]. Therefore, 
actual operator interventions become too conservative unless an appropriate prediction 
method is well established. 
In the present study, a new attempt has been made to optimize the management for 
the replacement of faulty fuel assemblies due to cladding failures, which is discussed in terms 
of the critical concentration of I-131 in the primary coolant water as well as the rate of water 
sampling to monitor I-131concentration. In section 2, the usual methodology for probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA) [12] is introduced and applied to an issue of fuel management 
optimization. Additionally, a model numerical equation describing the time evolution of I-131 
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concentration in the coolant water is proposed to be solved by the valuable Monte Carlo 
method. In section 3, some calculation results are shown as example cases, where the 
frequency of immediate reactor shutdown is evaluated as a risk caused by variation in the 
severity of fuel failures. An optimized management for the replacement of faulty fuel 





2.1. Methodology of risk assessment  
PRA is a useful and comprehensive methodology to find the residual risks associated 
with a complex engineered system. PRA is often applied to the safety assessment of nuclear 
power plants, using the event-tree (ET) and fault-tree (FT) techniques for detail calculations. 
In the present study, a unique attempt was made using the concept of PRA to optimize the 
management of fuel replacement accompanying cladding failures. As an index indicating the 
optimized level of management, the frequency of unscheduled immediate reactor shutdowns 
was chosen; the unscheduled immediate shutdown is a type of fuel management that is 
performed to cope with fuel leaks due to cladding failures. In this section, the procedure of 
PRA is simply explained using an example of seismic PRA [12] for better understanding. 
In the framework of conventional seismic PRA [12], such parameters as the core 
damage frequency (CDF) and containment failure frequency (CFF) are evaluated for reactor 
safety assessment, using ET and FT analyses that follow given accident scenarios with hazard 
and fragility curves, as shown in Figure 2 (a). The hazard curve shows the frequency of 
exceedance of seismic action as a hazard, which is in general a decreasing function of the 
peak ground acceleration (PGA), the magnitude of the hazard. This figure indicates that 
seismic actions with higher PGA occur less frequently. The fragility curve, however, exhibits 
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the occurrence probability of the failure of instruments, devices, and components in a reactor, 
which is reasonably considered to be an increasing function of PGA.  
We now consider cladding failures and the accompanying leaks of radioactive 
materials from the fuel pellet into the primary coolant water through a cladding breach. These 
events are very complicated and not easily described in detail due to the involvement of 
various phenomena, as explained above. An attempt to investigate the mechanisms of 
complicated events is very interesting in terms of materials science and fluid dynamics but is 
not the scope of the present study. Apart from those complexities and difficulties, let us 
consider a simple model of leak events with a reasonable assumption that a larger amount of 
leakage occurs less frequently. Two parameters, F and L, are introduced here to describe leak 
events, where F is the number of leak events occurring in unit time, and L is the amount of 
leakage per event with units of Bq (Becquerel)/event. From this assumption, F should be a 
decreasing function of L. The product F×L indicates a leak rate, R, with units of Bq/s, which 
may be an index reflecting the states of cladding materials and the surrounding environment. 
Figure 3 shows one example of relationships between F and L, where R is a constant. 
Next, let us compare the seismic hazard curve in Figure 2 (a) with the equivalent 
hazard curve in Figure 3 that represents the occurrence frequency of leak events. The two 
curves seem to be very similar. Based on this similarity, we have drawn the schematic 
diagram represented in Figure 2 (b), in which the occurrence frequency of fuel leaks due to 
cladding failures and the occurrence probability of unscheduled immediate reactor shutdowns 
due to fuel leaks are shown to correspond to the hazard and fragility curves in Figure 2 (a), 
respectively. From this correspondence, a leak event may be regarded as a hazard against the 
stable operation of a reactor. The amount of leakage per event may indicate the hazard 
magnitude, which may correspond to PGA in the seismic PRA. If this analogy is correct, we 
may finally obtain the shutdown frequency curve from our equivalent hazard and fragility 
curves, which could correspond to the core damage frequency curve in Figure 2 (a). 
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However, the present effort to apply PRA methodology to our fuel leak issues would 
have difficulty in preparing the formalism of the evaluation. Namely, the equivalent fragility 
curve that represents the occurrence probability of unscheduled immediate reactor shutdowns 
is not easily drawn from the beginning as a function of the amount of leakage per event, 
although the conventional PRA method requires a fragility curve prior to making an 
assessment. The amount of leakage on a per-event basis indicates the amount of radioactive 
materials released at once from the fuel pellet into the primary coolant water through a 
cladding breach, which could depend on such parameters as the size and shape of a breach, 
the ambient temperature, the coolant water pressure, and their gradients. Unfortunately, 
however, the amount of leakage per event cannot serve an appropriate role as a criterion index 
to judge unscheduled immediate reactor shutdowns because reactor shutdowns are judged by 
the concentration of radioactive materials accumulated so far in the coolant water. Therefore, 
in the present study, instead of ET and FT analyses along with fragility curves, we used the 
Monte Carlo technique. With this technique, the equivalent fragility curve is obtained later as 
an output of the Monte Carlo calculations rather than used as an input for the calculations.  
 
2.2. Monte Carlo model 
The concentration of radioactive I-131 in the primary coolant water is considered to be 
determined by a balance among the rate of leaks from fuel rods to the coolant water, the rate 
of radioactive decay, and the rate of reduction by purification at the water cleanup system in a 
reactor. The time derivative of concentration is thus expressed by the following equation [13]: 
 
                             ,                            (1) 
 
where C is the I-131 concentration in the primary coolant water in Bq/m3, t is the time in 












constant of I-131 in s-1, R is the leak rate described above, and Q is the rate of flow in the 
water cleanup system in m3/s. Note that the purification efficiency of the cleanup system is 
effectively involved in parameter Q. The parameter numbers used for the present calculations 
are listed in Table 1. Assuming that R is a constant, C is obtained by integrating Equation (1), 
as follows: 
 
                             .                   (2) 
 
Figure 4 shows the time evolution of I-131 concentration obtained by equation (2). As time 
evolves, the concentration approaches an asymptotic value of R/(λV + Q) that the 
concentration never theoretically exceeded. 
In practice, however, the concentration does not exhibit such a smooth and 
expectable curve because the cladding breach may be created by several different, 
complicated mechanisms described above, and, in addition, the crack initiation and 
propagation behavior during cladding failures is stochastic in essence. Moreover, leak 
behavior from the pellet to the primary coolant water through a breach is also stochastic, 
which may depend on not only the state of a breach (size and shape) but also reactor operating 
conditions [14]. To describe these stochastic behaviors, the Monte Carlo method could be an 
appropriate method and is applied here when a discretized form of Equation (1) is 
numerically integrated. The Monte Carlo method used in the present study is the same as that 
often used in materials modeling [15], and the time step used for numerical integrations was 
provided by the n-fold method [16], as Frt /)ln(−=∆ , where r is a random number 
between 0 and 1. Figure 5 shows an example of our calculation results, in which the time 
evolution of I-131 concentration is shown for cases with high and low F. The average 
behaviors of time evolution are the same; however, the fluctuations of concentrations are 





























value due to the existence of large fluctuations created by the Monte Carlo technique. The 
fluctuations are much greater for the case of low F than that of high F. This difference may 
lead to a clear difference in fuel management, as described below. 
To model the management of fuel replacement, a critical value of I-131 concentration is 
defined here, as represented by the horizontal dashed lines in Figure 5. Using the critical 
value, a judgment was made of whether or not to perform the fuel replacement. Namely, when 
the monitored temporal concentration is detected to excess the critical value, the reactor is 
judged to be shut down immediately to replace the faulty fuel assemblies with leaking rod. No 
constraints were imposed on the critical value in the present study, although it should 
primarily be identical to the value that is determined to follow the operator’s own rule or the 
LCO regulation, as described above.  
Furthermore, in the model, water sampling for monitoring I-131 concentration was 
assumed to be performed intermittently and periodically, as is currently done at actual nuclear 
power plants in Japan. If the monitoring is performed intermittently, there is a possibility of 
detection failure. Namely, even if the concentration in the coolant water is higher than the 
critical value, such an abnormal concentration can escape from detection when the state 
happens between water samplings. Such a possibility becomes higher when the sampling rate 
is lower. Despite intermittent monitoring with potential detection failures, when a higher 
concentration than the critical value is successfully detected at the opportunity of water 
sampling, the reactor is judged to be shut down, and the concentration is immediately forced 
to be zero in the model. This operation implies that fuel replacement is made at that time. 
Figure 6 shows an example of the model fuel management designed here, where water 
sampling is conducted once a week, and the critical concentration is given as indicated in the 
figure. The figure clearly shows that the concentration is forced to be zero when concentration 
exceeds the critical value at the opportunity of water sampling. 
From our discussion so far, model fuel management is eventually characterized by two 
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control parameters, the critical concentration value and the water sampling rate. For each set 
of the two control parameters, 1000 trials of the Monte Carlo calculations were performed to 
obtain the statistics. The number of fuel replacements during one cycle operation period was 
then counted, with one cycle period set to 13 months, which is equivalent to an operation 
period for commercial reactors in Japan. Finally, the frequency of unscheduled immediate 
reactor shutdowns was obtained as a function of the two control parameters.  
 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
Figure 7 is a double logarithmic plot of the equivalent hazard curve for fuel leaks, 
showing the occurrence frequency of leak events as a function of the amount of I-131 leakage 
per event. In the present study, we make the appropriate assumption that events with larger 
amounts of leakage occur less frequently. Using these data in the plot as input, Monte Carlo 
simulations were performed to obtain the time evolution of I-131 concentrations as well as the 
number of immediate reactor shutdowns that is performed to cope with fuel leaks, as a 
function of the two parameters, the critical concentration and the sampling rate.  
Figure 8 shows the shutdown frequency, which is defined as the average number of 
immediate reactor shutdowns during 13 months. Here, the leak rate, R, used for calculations is 
varied, as shown in the figure, but the critical concentration and sampling rate are fixed at 
1.3x109 Bq/m3 and 1.65x10-6 s-1, respectively. As shown in the figure, the shutdown 
frequency has a peak that increases with the leak rate, R. Fuel management requiring an 
immediate reactor shutdown becomes more frequent when the leak rate is larger, as easily 
expected. Furthermore, as shown in the figure, the amount of leakage per event at the peak 
position does not highly depend on the leak rate, R. 
Figure 9 shows the equivalent fragility curves that represent the probability of 
immediate reactor shutdown as a function of the amount of I-131 leakage per event. Different 
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from the original PRA technique, these equivalent fragility curves are obtained as a result of 
calculations, as mentioned above. As shown in the figure, the probability of immediate reactor 
shutdown increases with the amount of I-131 leakage per event, which may indicate that the 
amount of leakage on a per event basis is well correlated with the amount of leakage 
accumulated in the coolant water. Because the amount of leakage per event is considered to 
be related to such breach attributes as size and shape, suppression of the formation of 
relatively large breaches is an appropriate primary measure to efficiently reduce the number 
of unscheduled reactor shutdowns.  
From closer inspection of the curve, the probability of immediate reactor shutdown 
exhibits a sudden rise at approximately 1x1013 Bq/event in this case, independent of the leak 
rate, R. The amount of I-131 leakage per event at the sudden rise in the figure would seem to 
effectively be a threshold value for immediate reactor shutdown. When the amount of leakage 
per event exceeds the threshold, an immediate reactor shutdown is performed with a high 
probability to cope with fuel leaks, as shown in Figure 9, although those leak events occur 
infrequently, as is shown in Figure 7. The threshold value thus defined does not depend much 
on the leak rate, R, again, and would be consistent with the amount of I-131 leakage per event 
at the peak position of Figure 8.  
To obtain useful knowledge to realize optimized fuel management, the sensitivity of the 
two operational parameters, critical concentration and sampling rate, to the calculation results 
was investigated. Figure 10 shows the calculated shutdown frequency curves for a fixed 
value of R = 3x106 Bq/s as a function of the critical value of I-131 concentration to be used to 
judge whether or not immediate reactor shutdown occurs. Taking the lower critical value 
would seem to suggest that fuel management becomes more conservative, where earlier fuel 
replacements are performed for the purpose of pursuing reactor safety. Most likely, this 
expectation would not be inaccurate; unfortunately, however, it may not be so effective, as 
clearly shown in the figure. Even if the critical concentration adopts a lower value, only the 
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threshold value is sensitive and becomes lower, indicating that an object to be treated is 
expanded only to smaller breaches. Smaller breaches may have smaller impact on the future 
development of leak events in terms of fracture mechanics; therefore, fuel management using 
a relatively low critical concentration is considered to be less effective. 
Our Monte Carlo calculations also evaluated shutdown frequency as a function of 
sampling rate. Figure 11 indicates the frequency of unscheduled immediate reactor 
shutdowns for a fixed value of leak rate, R = 3x106 Bq/s, when the time interval of 
intermittent monitoring is changed from one day to one month. The time interval is the 
reciprocal of the sampling rate. With increased time interval, the frequency of immediate 
reactor shutdowns decreases as shown in the figure because, when the time interval becomes 
longer, the opportunity to find abnormal concentrations of I-131 in the coolant water is 
reduced. To clarify this point, additional calculations were performed to obtain the frequency 
of immediate reactor shutdowns when monitoring is continuously performed. By this 
monitoring, the concentration of I-131 in the coolant water can always be monitored; 
therefore, an unscheduled immediate reactor shutdown can be performed without fail for all 
events that require fuel replacement management. Figure 12 is a plot of the difference of the 
frequency of immediate reactor shutdown obtained by intermittent monitoring and that by 
continuous monitoring. The figure actually represents the frequency of occurrence of such an 
event that fuel replacement is really required but unfortunately missed. As shown in the figure, 
the frequency curve thus defined also has a peak, and the missing events obviously increase 
with increased time interval.  
Figure 11 also shows that the curves for a larger amount of I-131 leakage per event are 
very sensitive to a change in time interval, whereas the threshold is not influenced. This result 
may indicate that fuel management with a short time interval, i.e., frequent sampling, is an 
appropriate way to efficiently find fuel leaks through large breaches while maintaining the 





An attempt has been made to develop a methodology to optimize the fuel management 
for replacement of faulty fuel assemblies due to cladding failures, which was discussed in 
terms of such operational parameters as the critical concentration of I-131 leakage and the 
water sampling rate. The methodology was established within a similar framework as 
probabilistic risk assessment. A model numerical equation to describe the time evolution of 
I-131 concentration due to fuel leaks was proposed and then solved using the Monte Carlo 
method. The frequency of immediate reactor shutdown that is performed to cope with faulty 
fuel assemblies was used as an index indicating the optimized level of management and 
obtained as a function of the operational parameters. From the calculation results, we have 
finally concluded that, to achieve the optimized management of failed fuels, high resolution to 
detect a small amount of I-131 is not necessarily required, but frequent sampling is favorable. 
Further improvement is required for practical use of the model in actual fuel replacement 
management. Model validation and an appropriate comparison with experiments should be 
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Table 1 Parameter values used in the present calculations 
Leak rate, R 0.3x107 Bq/s ~ 3.0x107 Bq/s 
Decay constant, λ 9.964x10-7 s-1 
Flow rate, Q 2.14x10-2 m3/s 
System volume, V 7570 m3 
Critical concentration 0.3x109 Bq/m3 ~ 1.3x109 Bq/m3 
Sampling rate 3.86x10-7 s-1 ~ 1.16x10-5 s-1  





















Fig.1 Number of operational response to fuel leaks per year conducted at (a) 






Fig.2 Schematic representations of the methodology of (a) seismic PRA [12] 





Fig.3 Equivalent hazard curve representing the occurrence frequency of leak 

















Fig.5 Time evolution of the concentration of I-131 in the primary coolant water 








Fig.6  An example of calculations, which represents the time evolution of I-131 
concentration when the water sampling is conducted once a week. The critical 
concentration is given as indicated by the horizontal dashed line. In this case, 
the fuel replacement is observed to be performed at just after 7 weeks, when 


















 Fig.8  Frequency of unscheduled immediate reactor shutdown due to fuel 




















Fig.9  Equivalent fragility curve for fuel leaks obtained by the Monte Carlo 






Fig.10 Shutdown frequency curves when the critical value of I-131 












Fig. 11 Frequency of immediate reactor shutdown for a fixed value of the leak 
rate, R = 3x106 Bq/s, when the time interval of intermittent monitoring is 












Fig. 12 Frequency of the occurrence of such an event that the fuel 
replacement is really required but unfortunately missed. 
 
 
 
